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Defendant/Respondent,

Albert

Kienke,

respectfully

submits the following Brief of Respondent.
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case is an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from a
unanimous decision of the Utah Court of Appeals dated May 10,
1989,

affirming

summary

judgment

Defendant/Respondent, Albert Kienke.

in

favor

of

Plaintiff filed a Petition

for Rehearing, which was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on
June 2, 1989.

The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari on

August 31, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented to this Court for
review:
1.

Whether landowner owes his tenant a duty to warn or

to make safe a dangerous condition that was created by and known
to the tenant.
2.
performed

Whether

a

part-time

landlord,

whose

tenant

repairs and improvements to the rental premises in

exchange for rent without controls by the landowner, is liable
for injuries

to the tenant as a statutory employer under the

Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
3.

Whether punitive damages are appropriate against a

landlord where the tenant died from injuries sustained
result of a risk created by the tenant.

as a

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This Court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann., Section
35-1-42, as amended 1983; Section 35-1-43, as amended 1984; and
Section 35-1-57, as amended 1969, may be pertinent to one of the
issues on appeal.

Copies of said statutes as they read at the

time of the incident in question in January of 1985 are set forth
in Appendix "A" to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing

Plaintiff's wrongful death action.

Plaintiff's decedent, Robert

English, was in the process of rebuilding the front porch of a
house that he was renting from the Defendant when the temporary
supports Mr. English had placed under the roof of the porch gave
way and the roof fell on him, resulting in his death.

Plaintiff

filed suit against the landowner, Albert Kienke, alleging that
Mr. Kienke was negligent in failing to make safe or to warn the
decedent of the dangerous condition of the porch created by the
decedent and further alleging that Mr. Kienke was liable as
Mr. English's employer under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
Plaintiff's

Complaint further

Mr. Kienke, alleging

sought punitive damages against

"knowing

and

safety of Plaintiff's deceased."
-2-

reckless disregard

for the

2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
At

the

conclusion

of

discovery

counter-motions for summary judgment.

the

parties

filed

The Trial Court, Honorable

David S. Young presiding, denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The

Summary

Judgment

was

entered

by

the

Trial

Court

on

September 4, 1987.
Plaintiff appealed the Summary Judgment of the Trial
Court and on May 10, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its
decision affirming the Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant.
Plaintiff filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was denied by the
Utah Court of Appeals on June 2, 1989.
Plaintiff petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ
of Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court granted the Petition and this case is now on
appeal before the Utah Supreme Court.
3.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The "Statement of Relevant Facts" in Appellant's brief

is argumentative, conclusory, misleading and without support in
the record.

Appellant's Statement of "Facts" refers repeatedly

to conclusions of law stated in Plaintiff's Memorandum filed with
the Trial Court (R. 181, 182), none of which were supported by
the depositions and pleadings on file with the Court.
-3-

These

assertions of "Facts11 were fully disputed and controverted in the
deposition of Albert Kienke and in Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 153-157).
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:
1.

Albert Kienke has worked for the Utah Department of

Transportation for the last 25 years as a land acquisition agent.
He has a part-time business as a small landowner.

(Deposition of

Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 4-6, 14-16).
2.

Defendant, Albert Kienke, and his wife were the

joint owners of a house located at 1031 Windsor Street in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
3.

In

extensive repairs.

(Id. at p. 3).
December

1984, the

house

was

in

need

of

There was a hole in the ceiling, holes in the

doors, kitchen cabinet doors needed to be rehung, the carpet
needed to be replaced and the front porch needed work.

(Id. at

pp. 38-42).
4.

The ceiling inside the front porch was in poor

shape and one beam on the north side of the front porch was
sagging considerably.

The roof of the porch was supported by big

columns which needed paint but other than that, there was nothing
wrong with them. (Id. at p. 42).
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5.

Robert English was born on March 18, 1957.

28 years of age at the time of his death.

He was

(Deposition of Daniel

English, Record at 267, p. 4).
6.

Robert

English was

a graduate

University of Utah at the time of his death.

student

at the

(Record at 146,

148) .
7.

In

January

of

1985

Robert

English

Mr. Kienke to ask him if he had a place to rent.

telephoned
Mr. Kienke

responded that the only place that was vacant was the house at
1031 Windsor which needed "an awful lot of repairs."
said that he was interested in doing the repairs.

Mr. English

(Deposition of

Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 44-46).
8.

Mr. Kienke met Mr. English at the Windsor Street

house in January 1985.

Mr. English said he needed a place to

rent but he didn't have a lot of money.
place needed a lot of work.

Mr. Kienke said the

Mr. English asked if he could do

the work in exchange for the rent.

Mr. Kienke agreed.

(Id. at

pp. 46-47).
9.

Mr. Kienke showed Mr. English the property and

pointed out what repairs were needed, including a new plywood
floor, new linoleum in the kitchen, new kitchen cabinets, a new
floor and linoleum in the bathroom, paint in the kitchen, paint

-5-

on the outside, and repair work on the ceiling of the front
porch.

(Id. at pp. 48-52).
10.

The front porch seemed

solid but Mr. English

suggested that he could repair the bottoms of the posts on the
two outside corners of the porch and that he could repair a
couple of loose boards on the steps.
11.

(Id. at pp. 52-54).

Mr. English drew up all of the plans for repairs

and submitted them to Mr. Kienke for approval.

(Id. at pp. 55-

57).
12.
giving

Mr.

Mr. Kienke paid for the materials used by either
English

Mr. English later.

checks

in

advance,

(Id. at p. 57).

or

by

reimbursing

Mr. Kienke occasionally

supplied materials himself. (Id., at pp. 60-62).
13.

Mr. English planned the work himself, and did the

work on his own.

Mr. Kienke testified:

Well, he wanted to do it all and plan it. So
I just left him alone and let him do it
because he was doing it. He was in charge of
it, and he was doing it.
(Id. at p. 56).
14.

Mr. English did all of the work himself except

that Mr. Kienke made a jam for the back door which Mr. English
installed. (Id. at p. 58).
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15.

During the time that Mr. English was working on

the house, Mr. Kienke would not see Mr. English for a month or
two at a time.
16.
Mr. English

(Id. at p. 62).
The

regarding

only
the

instructions

Mr.

repairs

that

were

quality work done, but not to go overboard

Kienke

gave

he wanted

to
good

on the expense,

because it was a rental unit. (Id. at pp. 55-60).
17.

Mr. English provided most of his own hand tools

but borrowed a power Skil saw, a shovel, a tub to mix cement and
a roof jack from Mr. Kienke. (Id. at pp. 66, 67).
18.

Before Mr. English began work on the porch, he

told Mr. Kienke that he was going to replace the two posts on
each end of the porch and pour cement footings for the posts.
Mr. Kienke told Mr. English not to do any more than he had to,
but mainly repair the porch ceiling, repair the sagging beam on
the north side of the porch, and install some planks on the
floor. (Id. at pp. 68-70).
19.

In

December

1985,

Mr.

English

telephoned

Mr. Kienke and said he wanted to show Mr. Kienke what he had done
on the porch.

Mr. Kienke went to the house and was shocked to

find that the whole lower part of the porch, the decking, the
steps, and the sub-beams had been removed.
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All that remained was

the roof of the porch and the three columns which Mr. English had
supported with cement blocks.
20.

(Id., at pp. 71-73).

Mr. Kienke told Mr. English to be certain to have

plenty of two-by-fours at the sides of the porch to support the
ceiling.

Mr. English told Mr. Kienke how he was going to build

the porch and his plans appeared adequate to Mr. Kienke.

(Id. at

p. 74).
21.

On January 4, 1986, the roof of the porch fell

from its temporary supports onto Mr. English, causing his death.
(Complaint, Record at p. 3, paragraph 2).
22.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following causes

of action against Defendant, Albert Kienke:
a.
Mr. Kienke breached his duty as a
landowner by failing to reasonably discover
dangerous conditions on the land, failing to
warn Mr. English and failing to barricade and
limit access to the porch area.
b.
Mr. Kienke was the employer of
Mr. English and Mr. Kienke breached his duty
as his employer by failing to provide a safe
place to work, failing to supervise the
decedent and failing to adequately prepare
and design the construction project.
c. Mr. Kienke acted in knowing and reckless
disregard for the law and the rights of the
decedent, thereby entitling Plaintiff to
punitive damages.
(Record at pp. 2-5).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Albert Kienke was under no duty to warn his tenant,

Robert English, of dangerous conditions on the premises that were
not only known to Mr. English, but were actually created by
Mr. English.

The

alleged

dangerous

condition,

i.e.,

the

inadequate support for the porch roof, was created by Mr. English
strictly on his own, contrary to his previous discussion with
Mr. Kienke.

Even if Mr. Kienke had a duty to warn Mr. English of

the dangerous condition of the porch created by Mr. English,
Mr. Kienke clearly satisfied that duty after he saw the condition
created by Mr. English by instructing Mr. English to be certain
to have plenty of two-by-fours

at the side of the porch to

support

which

the

roof, instructions

Mr.

English

apparently

ignored.
2.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that since

Albert Kienke was not negligent as a matter of law, it was not
necessary

to

reach

statutory

employer

Compensation Act.

the
of

issue
Mr.

of

English

whether

Mr.

Kienke was a

under

the

Utah

Workers1

If it were necessary to decide that issue, the

lower court correctly ruled that Mr. English was an independent
contractor and not an employee of Mr. Kienke under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.
to

supervise

or

control

Mr. Kienke did not retain the right
the

work
-9-

of

Mr.

English.

Also,

Mr. Kienke was not regularly involved in the construction trade
and the work being done by Mr. English was not part or process in
the trade or business of Mr. Kienke.

The work hours and manner

of performance were not in any manner subject to Mr. Kienke?s
control.

Even the nature of the improvements were in large part

determined solely by Mr. English and the decision to remove the
supports from the porch roof was made solely by Mr. English,
contrary

to

his

prior

discussions

with

Mr. Kienke.

Thus,

Mr. Kienke is not the statutory employee of Mr. English within
the meaning of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act.
3.

Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages are not

supported by any evidence and were properly dismissed by the
Trial

Court.

The

dangerous

condition

which

contributed

Mr. English's death was created by Mr. English himself.

to
The

record contains no evidence that Mr. Kienke was guilty of any
willful or malicious conduct or acted with knowing and reckless
disregard for the safety of Mr. English.
ARGUMENT
Rule

56(c)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

requires that:
[Summary]
judgment
shall
be
rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
-10-

Procedure

material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to adjudgment as a matter of law.
Moreover,

in

negligence

actions,

as

in

all

cases,

bare

contentions that are unsupported in the record, raise no material
issues of fact as will preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980).
The case at bar presents no genuine issues of material
fact.
the

Robert English created the risk himself when he removed

solid

support

support

posts

columns

placed

on

and
top

replaced
of

them

stacks

of

with

temporary

cement

blocks.

Mr. Kienke is not liable for a dangerous condition created by his
tenant.
POINT I
LANDOWNER KIENKE WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO WARN
HIS TENANT ENGLISH OF RISKS THAT NOT ONLY
WERE OBVIOUS AND APPARENT, BUT WERE CREATED
BY THE TENANT.
The

uncontroverted

deposition

testimony

of

Albert

Kienke establishes that the condition of the porch which resulted
in its collapse and the death of Robert English was not created
by any actions or inaction on the part of Albert Kienke, but was
instead created solely by the decedent, Robert English.

Prior to

Mr. English's work on the porch, the ceiling and one beam on the
north side of the porch were in disrepair but the columns which
supported

the

porch

roof

were
-11-

strong

and

stable.

It was

Mr. English?s idea to remove those support columns and replace
them with temporary posts supported on cement blocks.

In fact,

this was contrary to his previous discussions with Mr. Kienke in
which Mr. Kienke told Mr. English he should not do any more than
he had

to, but mainly repair

the porch ceiling, repair the

sagging beam on the north side of the porch and install some
planks on the floor.
When Mr. Kienke saw the porch in December of 1985, he
was shocked to see that Mr. English had removed the whole lower
part of the porch, including the columns and replaced them with
temporary supports on cement blocks.

At that time Mr. Kienke

told Mr. English to be certain to have plenty of two-by-fours at
the sides of the porch to support the porch roof.

Mr. Kienke did

not return to the house again until January 4, 1986, after the
roof

of

the

porch

fell

from

its

temporary

supports

onto

Mr. English, causing his death.
The law in Utah is well settled that a landlord is not
liable to his tenant for injuries caused by dangerous conditions
created by the tenant.

In Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P. 2d 567

(Utah 1978), the plaintiff's service station attendant sued both
his employer and the lessor of the station for burns he suffered
while using gasoline to clean up grease spots on the floor in the
presence of a water heater flame.
-12-

The Utah Supreme Court upheld

summary judgment in favor of the landowner, holding that while a
landowner

may

be

liable

for

injuries

caused

by

dangerous

conditions created by the landlord or of which the landlord was
aware when possession of the property was transferred to the
tenant, the landlord cannot be liable for injuries caused by
dangerous conditions created by the tenant.

The Court stated:

. . • it is the tenant who is liable for any
dangerous condition on the premises which he
creates or permits to come into existence
after
he
has
taken possession
(cites
Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 355*)
In the present case the alleged dangerous condition
(the inadequate support posts for the porch roof) was created
solely by Mr. English without
Mr. Kienke.
strong

involvement whatsoever by

Mr. Kienke had not wanted Mr. English to remove the

support

Mr. English's

any

columns

decision

on

the

to do

porch

so.

and

it

was

When Mr. Kienke

solely
saw the

condition he told Mr. English to use plenty of two-by-fours to
support the porch roof but Mr. English apparently did not do so
because the porch roof collapsed on Mr. English several days
later.

Mr. Kienke had absolutely nothing to do with the creation

of the dangerous condition which resulted in Mr. English's death
and it was solely created by Mr. English*
established

law

Mr. Kienke

is

not

Mr. English.
-13-

Therefore, under well-

liable

for

the

death of

The Appellant's brief is essentially asking this Court
to overrule the decision in Stephenson, reject the position of
Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 355 and rule that a landlord has
a duty to continually inspect the tenant's premises to determine
whether

the

tenant

has

created

dangerous

conditions

on

the

property and to protect the tenant from injuries resulting from
his own negligence.

Plaintiff fails to cite a single case which

would support such an extraordinary rule.

Instead, Plaintiff's

brief cites the very recent decision from the Utah Court of
Appeals of Donahue v. Purfee, 118 Utah Advance Reports 64 (Utah
Ct.

of

App., September

28, 1989), which

rejected

the long-

standing "open and obvious danger rule," holding that the fact
that a danger is open and obvious is not an absolute defense to
an action by an injured guest against the landowner for an injury
caused by that danger.

What Plaintiff's brief fails to point out

is that the Ponahue case specifically reaffirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision in the present case that a landowner is not
liable for injuries to the tenant caused by a dangerous condition
created by the tenant.

Footnote 4 to the Ponahue decision reads

as follows:
4. Our decision in this case will no doubt
narrow somewhat the range of cases involving
landowner liability in which summary judgment
will be appropriate.
However, summary
judgment will still be available, even
though the landowner will be unable to take
-14-

refuge behind the open and obvious danger
doctrine, in situations where the landowner
establishes undisputed facts showing he was
not negligent as a matter of law.
Such
situations include plaintiffs who are solely
responsible
for creating
the dangerous
condition on defendant's land. E.g., English
v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Utah Ct. of
App. 1989)
While the Donahue case casts doubt on the "open and
obvious danger rule,"x it certainly does not affect in any way
the

long-standing

rule

that

a

landlord

is

dangerous conditions created by the tenant.

not

liable

for

Plaintiff has

failed to cite a single case from Utah or any other jurisdiction
which would support a rejection of that rule.
Plaintiff's brief claims that Mr. Kienke was "actively
involved in the repairs."

The brief asserts that the record

"was replete with facts" supporting the inference that Mr. Kienke
was a "trained contractor/landowner" who controlled the work of
his tenant and breached his duty to exercise reasonable care
toward the tenant.

Understandably, the brief cites no such facts

1

The decision by the Court of Appeals in Donahue is
subject to some question. In addition to abandoning the open and
obvious danger rule followed as recently as 1981 by the Utah
Supreme Court in Moore v. Burton Lumber and Hardware Co., 631
P.2d 865 (Utah 1981), the Donahue case reasons that the previous
cases upholding summary judgment under the open and obvious
danger rule were decided before the adoption of comparative
negligence.
Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978),
involved an accident after the effective date of the comparative
negligence law.
-15-

from the record, as the record simply contains no such facts.
The evidence is very clear that Mr. Kienke exercised virtually no
controls over Mr. English's repairs on the house and Mr. English
took

it solely upon himself

to remove the strong and solid

supports to the porch roof and thereby create the dangerous
condition which resulted in his death.
Even if Mr. Kienke had any obligation to Mr. English to
warn him of dangerous conditions, the undisputed evidence clearly
shows that Mr. Kienke did warn Mr. English and told him to
provide

plenty

of

two-by-fours

to

support

the

roof

but

Mr. English apparently failed to do so.
The uncontroverted evidence clearly establishes that
the injuries to and death of Mr. English were caused solely by
the negligence of Mr. English and not by any negligent act or
inaction on the part of Mr. Kienke.

The Trial Court correctly

held that Mr. Kienke breached no duty to Mr. English and properly
granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Kienke.
POINT II
ROBERT ENGLISH WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE UNDER THE UTAH WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT.
Plaintiff

has

characterized

the

rental

arrangement

between Robert English and Albert Kienke, by which Mr. English
did certain repair work on the house in lieu of rent, as an
-16-

employer-employee
attempting

to

Annotated

relationship.

take

(1953

as

In

advantage

of

amended),

which

so

doing,

Section

plaintiff

35-1-57, Utah

provides

that

is
Code

where

an

employer fails to provide workers1 compensation coverage to an
employee, proof of injury to the employee shall constitute prima
facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and the
employer cannot assert the defenses of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence.
would

certainly

be

Lacking evidence of negligence, this

advantageous

to the plaintiff.

Such an

assertion, however, is clearly not supported in fact or in law.
The

Court

of

Appeals

correctly

held

that

since

Mr. Kienke was not negligent as a matter of law, it was not
necessary

to

Mr. English's

reach

the

statutory

issue

of

employer.

whether

Mr.

If

Kienke

Mr.

Kienke
was

was
not

negligent he cannot be liable under Section 35-1-57, Utah Code
Annotated,

1953.

Moreover, the uncontroverted

facts clearly

establish that Robert English was not the employee of Albert
Kienke for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.
In Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316
(Utah

1975),

the

Court

examined

the

employee and an independent contractor.

difference

between

The Court stated:

Speaking in generality: an employee is one
who is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at
a fixed rate, to perform the employer's work
as directed by the employer and who is
-17-

an

subject to a comparatively high degree of
control in performing those duties.
In
contrast, an independent contractor is one
who is engaged to do some particular project
or piece of work, usually for a set total
sum, who may do the job in his own way,
subject to only minimal restriction or
controls and is reasonable only for its
satisfactory completion.
The main facts to be considered as bearing on
the relationship here are:
(1) whatever
covenants or agreements exist regarding the
right of direction and control over the
employee, whether expressed or implied; (2)
the right to hire and fire; (3) the method of
payment, i.e., whether in wages or in fees,
as compared to payment for a complete job or
project; and (4) the furnishing of the
equipment.
Id. at 318.
In

Graham

v.

R.

Thorne

Foundation,

675

P.2d

1196

(Utah 1984), the plaintiff, a roofer, contended that he was an
employee

of

the

defendant

construction

workers1

compensation coverage.

company,

entitled

to

He was paid according to the

number of roofing squares installed, and he used his own method
of installation.

He would bill the defendant on a monthly basis

for the work done.

The defendant made no deductions for Social

Security or withholding tax.

The plaintiff used his own tools

and established his own work schedule.

The defendant had only a

few employees, such as bookkeepers, and relied on independent
contractors to do most of the construction work.

The defendant

furnished the shingles and nails and determined the time the
-18-

plaintiff should devote to on a specific job.

The defendant gave

the plaintiff instructions as to use of odd pieces of shingles,
installing flashing and shingling after plumbing was complete.
The Court held that under these circumstances the plaintiff was
an independent contractor, and not an employee.
did

not

have

sufficient

supervision

and

The defendant

control

over

the

plaintiff to be the plaintiff's employer.
Applying the rules of the foregoing cases to this case,
it is clear that Mr. English was not an employee of Albert
Kienke.

Mr. English was not paid a set wage; he received only

free rent in exchange for the work he performed.

The value

of

this rent was never established, nor was the amount of work to be
performed

by

determined.

Mr.

English

There

were

in

exchange

no

time

for

the

limitations

rent
placed

ever
on

Mr. English, nor was he told when the work was to be done or what
hours he should keep.

Mr. English did all of the work in the

house himself except that Mr. Kienke made a jam for the back door
which Mr. English installed.

The only instructions Mr. Kienke

gave Mr. English regarding the repairs were that he wanted good
quality work but not to go overboard in expense because it was a
rental unit.

Mr. English made all the plans for the work to be

done himself and merely submitted the plans to Mr. Kienke for his
approval, though sometimes this was not even done.
-19-

Regarding the front porch, Mr. English did not even
submit the plans to Mr. Kienke before he began the project.
Instead, he took it upon himself to remove the entire underside
of the porch and put in the temporary supports for the porch
roof.

Mr. English did all of the work on the porch himself.

In

these facts it is clear that the criteria established in the
cases cited above are not met.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a
landowner exercised less supervision or control over the person
performing work on the landownerf s property than in the present
case.

Had Mr. Kienke hired a private contractor to perform the

repairs, he certainly would not have provided the contractor
nearly as much freedom as he allowed Robert English.

If the

Court finds Robert English to be the employee of Albert Kienke,
any homeowner or small landowner who contracts with any workman
to perform remodeling or even routine maintenance tasks on his
home, would be subject to liability for workers' compensation
benefits in the event of injury to the workman.

Such a result

clearly was not contemplated by the legislature in drafting the
workers' compensation laws, nor has this Court so interpreted
them.
Another serious injustice could result if the Court
were to hold that Robert English was an employee of Mr. Kienke.
-20-

The standard commercial liability insurance policy contains an
exclusion for claims for injuries to an employee arising out of
or in the course of his employment.

See Truck Insurance Exchange

v. Yardley, 556 P.2d 494 (Utah 1976).

A part-time landlord such

as Albert Kienke would not anticipate that he may be subject to
workers1 compensation liability in the event of injury to one of
his tenants who exchanges work for rent.

If the tenant is

injured and sues the landlord, the landlord may then find that
he has no insurance coverage for the suit, even though he has had
the foresight to obtain liability insurance.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE AND WERE
PROPERLY DISMISSED.
Plaintiff/appellant seeks to recover punitive damages
against

Defendant/appellee,

Albert

Kienke,

alleging

that

Mr. Kienke acted in "knowing and reckless disregard for the law
and the rights of Plaintiff's deceased" in failing to correct a
known dangerous condition, failing to prepare proper plans and
submit

them

obtaining

to

the

building

appropriate

permits,

authority

continuing

for

purposes

construction

of

of
the

premises after being warned of the dangerous condition by the
Building and Housing Authority and failing to warn Plaintiff's
deceased of a known dangerous condition on the premises.
-21-

There

is

no

evidence

that Mr. Kienke

dangerous condition which contributed
English.

knew of any

to the death of Robert

The dangerous condition which resulted in the death of

Mr. English was a condition created by Mr. English in removing
the

supports

from

the porch

roof

and putting

in

inadequate

temporary supports, all of which was done solely by Mr. English.
All of the plans and construction were done by Mr. English, and
not by Mr. Kienke.
In order to establish a cause of action for punitive
damages, the Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant was guilty
of

"willful

and

malicious

conduct"

or

that

the

Defendant's

conduct "manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of, the rights of others."

Atkin Wright & Miles v.

Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985).

There is no

evidence whatsoever to support such a claim against Defendant
and the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
A landowner is not liable to a tenant for injuries
caused

by

a dangerous

condition which is not only open and

obvious, but was created by the tenant.

The alleged dangerous

condition, i.e., inadequate supports for the roof was created not
by the landowner, Mr. Kienke, but by the tenant, Mr. English.
-22-

Mr. English took it solely upon himself to remove the strong and
solid supports to the house and to replace them with temporary
supports on concrete blocks.

Mr. Kienke had nothing to do with

the creation of the dangerous condition.

Even if there were any

duty on the part of Mr. Kienke to warn Mr. English of any
dangerous condition, he so warned Mr. English and his warnings
were

ignored.

Therefore,

the

lower

court

properly

granted

summary judgment in favor of Mr. Kienke.
The lower court also properly held as a matter of law
that Mr. Kienke, who allowed Mr. English to do work in exchange
for rent, was not the employer of Mr. English for purposes of
Workers' Compensation.

Mr. English had a virtual free hand to do

the work as he pleased, design the improvements himself, and
choose and purchase the materials.

Mr. English determined when

he would work and, to a large extent, what work he would do.

He

drew up his own plans, performed the work by himself, and, for
the most part, used his own tools.

He was not paid a wage but

was only allowed to live rent free in the house.

Mr. Kienke

clearly did not retain the right of control necessary to be the
employer of Mr. English*
The Trial Court also properly granted summary judgment
dismissing Plaintiff's punitive damages claims.

There is no

evidence of any willful or malicious conduct or knowing and
-23-

reckless

disregard

of

the

safety

of

others on

the part of

Mr. Kienke.
Defendant, Albert Kienke, respectively submits that the
summary judgment entered by the Trial Court should be affirmed.
DATED this

/ y 7 day of ^ ^ S r r "

, 1989.
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35-1-42

LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

employed at each kind of employment; the scale of wages paid in each class of
employment, showing the minimum and maximum wages paid; and the aggregate
amount of wages paid to all employees; which information shall be furnished on
blanks to be prepared by the commission and furnished employers free of charge
upon request therefor. Every employer shall cause such blanks to be properly filled
out so as to answer fully and correctly all questions therein propounded, and shall
give all the information therein sought, or, if unable to do so, he shall give to the
commission, in writing, good and sufficient reasons for such failure. The commission may require the information herein required to be furnished to be made under
oath and returned to the commission within the period fixed by it or by law. The
commission, or any member thereof, or any person employed by the commission
for that purpose, shall have the right to examine, under oath, any employer, his
agents or employees, for the purpose of ascertaining any information which such
employer is required by this title to furnish to the commission. Any employer who,
within a reasonable time to be fixed by the commission and after the receipt of
written notice signed by at least two members of the commission specifying the
information demanded and served by registered mail, refuses to furnish to the commission the annual statement herein required, or who refuses to furnish such other
information as may be required by the commission under authority of this section,
or who willfully furnishes a false or untrue statement shall be liable to a penalty
of not to exceed $500 for each offense to be recovered in a civil action brought
by and in the name of the commission. All such penalties when collected shall be
paid into the combined injury benefit fund.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 34; C.L. 1917,
§ 3094, L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1, R.S 1933, 42-1-39;
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1, C. 1943, 42-1-39; L. 1945,
ch. 65, § 1, 1977, ch. 156, § 2.

Compiler's Notes.
T h e 1 9 7 7 amendment deleted "at the state
capitol" after "mail to the commission" near
t n e beginning of the second sentence of the
first paragraph.

35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly employed —
Independent contractors. The following shall constitute employers subject to the
provisions of this title:
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district in the state.
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility,
having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, except agricultural employers who meet any
one of the following conditions: (a) whose employees are all members of the immediate family of the employer, which employer has a proprietary interest in the farm
; provided that the inclusion of any immediate family member under the provisions
of this title is at the option of the employer or (b) who employ five or fewer persons
other than immediate family members for 40 hours or more per week per each
employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months;
and except domestic employers who do not employ one employee or more than one
employee at least 40 hours per week; provided, that employers of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come under the terms of this
title by complying with the provisions thereof and the rules and regulations of the
commission.
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employments in the usual
course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer, whether
continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year.
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him
by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work
is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and
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ail persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and ail persons
employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this
section, employees of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation
engaged in the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed
an employer within the meaning of this section. The term "independent contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or corporation engaged
in the performance of any work for another, who, while so engaged, is independent
of the employer in all t h a t pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a
definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting
a result in accordance with the employer's design.
contractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious
to deny benefits on the ground that claimant
was a self-employed contractor, even though
general contractor furnished materials and
directed claimant to some extent with regard
to the manner of installation. Graham v. R.
Thorne Foundation (1983) 675 P 2d 1196.
Subcontractor, who was both owner and
employee of his business, was considered
employee of general contractor for workers'
compensation purposes where metal work
done by subcontractor was part of process in
general contractor's business, and where general contractor had substantial right, under
the
arrangement,
to
control
the
subcontractor's work. Pinter Constr. Co. v.
Frisby (1984) 678 P 2d 305.

History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 50; C.L. 1917,
§3110; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-40;
L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-40; L. 1949,
ch. 52, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 1; 1983, ch. 355, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment substituted "except
agricultural employers: (a) whose employees
are * * * or more than one employee at least
forty hours per week" in subsec. (2) for
"except agricultural laborers and domestic
servants."
The 1983 amendment inserted "who meet
any one of the following conditions" in
subsec. (2); inserted "all" in subsec. (2)(a);
added the proviso to subsec. (2)(a); deleted a
subsec. (2)(b) which read: "whose cash payments to one or more employees amounted to
less than $2,500 during the preceding calendar year"; redesignated subsec. (2)(c) as
(2)(b); substituted "who employ five or fewer
persons other than immediate family members" in subsec. (2)(b) for "who do not
employ at least four persons", and made
minor changes in phraseology and style.
Contractor employees.
The cleaning of oil storage tanks was a
part or process in the business of an oil
refining company, and the company was the
employer of a contractor's employees
engaged to clean the tanks. Lee v. Chevron
Oil Co. (1977) 565 P 2d 1128.
Employee and independent contractor.
Subcontractor, who was both owner and
employee of his business, was considered
employee of general contractor for workers'
compensation purposes where metal work
done by subcontractor was part of process in
general contractor's business, and where general contractor had substantial right, under
the
arrangement,
to
control
the
subcontractor's work. Pinter Constr. Co. v.
Frisby (1984) 678 P 2d 305.
Independent contractor.
Where workers' compensation claimant
was injured while installing roof for general

Relationship of employer and employee.
Where "independent contractor" had no
choice of the terms of his truck lease, drove
a truck owned by lessor, hauled only loads
that had been approved by his supervisor,
was not free to refuse a load, was obliged to
travel a certain route, and operate a certain
number of miles per month at a specified
speed, there was reasonable basis for conclusion of the industrial commission that plaintiff was an employee within the meaning of
the workmen's compensation statute. Harry
L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton (1975) 538
P 2d 316.
Evidence showing that claimant was an
experienced drywall installer associated with
an independent business; that plaintiff lodge
contacted the business concerning installation of drywall on its premises; that the business was not interested, but plaintiff and
claimant individually agreed that claimant
would do the work for a specified hourly rate;
that under the terms of the agreement claimant was to furnish his own special tools and
plaintiff was to furnish him with a ladder
and protective drop cloth; that plaintiff
employed a "handyman crew" to conduct
maintenance and repair work for it; that
before beginning work claimant was "taken
over the entire job," shown what services
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were to be performed, shown where to stack directed claimant to some extent with regard
the drywall and told not to damage the floor; to the manner of installation. Graham v. R.
and that he was not allowed to begin work Thorne Foundation (1983) 675 P 2d 1196.
at his first appearance was sufficient to sup- Subcontractor an employee.
port a finding that claimant was plaintiffs
,
, ^
,
n .
l™r.u,r«« o n j fufl ™™™;oo™ A;A ™* nk„o«
Subcontractor, who was both owner and
employee, ana the commission aid not abuse
,
- ,.' ,
.,
,
its discretion in awarding compensation for e m P °yee °/ h l s business, was considered
injuries sustained when claimant suffered a employee of general contractor for workers
fall while working at the lodge. Rustler dcompensation
Purposes where metal work
one b
Lodge v. Industrial Comm. (1977) 562 P 2d
f subcontractor was part of process in
227
general contractor s business, and where gen/ truck
. , driver
, • who
, took
. , a tractor
. . ihome in
.
eral
had .substantial right,
A
,, contractor
.8 ,under
. .
,
,
,
,
the
arrangement,
to
control
order
to, service
and clean it was ,,an employee
,
. . ,s work.
, Pinter
. nCo.the
D. .
nConstr.
,
.
,
,
,
.
*
subcontractor
v.
M
of the trucks owner as well as the lessee of ™ • , t,noA\ ^Q D OJ one
F n s b y ( 1 9 8 4 ) 6 8 P 2 d 305
the truck. Kinne v. Industrial Comm. (1980)
'
'
609 P 2d 926.
Tests and determinative factors.
Where workers' compensation claimant
In determining who is the employer of an
was injured while installing roof for general employee, the right to control the employee's
contractor, it was not arbitrary or capricious work is dispositive of the question; the
to deny benefits on the ground that claimant degree of control actually exercised need not
was a self-employed contractor, even though be great, so long as the right exists,
general contractor furnished materials and Bambrough v. Bethers (1976) 552 P 2d 1286.
35-1-43. "Employee," "workmen," and "operative" defined — Mining lessees and sublessees — Partners and sole proprietors — Real estate agent or
broker. (1) The words "employee," "workmen/' and "operative," as used in this
chapter, mean:
(a) every elective and appointive officer, and every other person, in the service
of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within the state, serving
the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral, including
all officers and employees of the state institutions of learning^]; and
(b) every person in the service of any employer as defined in Subsection
35-1-42(2), who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express
or implied, oral or written, including aliens, and minors whether legally or illegally
working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is casual and
not in the usual course of trade, business, or occupation of his employer.
(2) All lessees in mines or of mining property and the employees and sublessees
of all such lessees shall, unless the lessee provides coverage as an employer under
this chapter, be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter, and
shall, in such event, be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the
same extent as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are
paid employees for similar or substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct
from the proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance
premium for such type of work.
(3) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include as an employee
under this chapter, any member of such partnership, or the owner of the sole
proprietorship. If such election occurs, the employer shall serve upon the employer's insurance carrier and upon the commission written notice naming the partners
to be covered. No partner is considered an employee under this chapter until such
notice has been given. For premium rate making the insurance carrier shall assume
the salary or wage of such employee to be 150% of the state's average weekly wage.
(4) As used in this chapter, the words "employee," "workman," and "operative"
do not include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section 61-2-2,
who performs services as such for a real estate broker if:

28

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-45

(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's or associated broker's income for
services is from real estate commissions;
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are performed
under a written contract specifying t h a t the real estate agent is an independent
contractor; and
(c) the contract states that the real estate agent or associated broker is not
to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 51, C.L. 1917,
§ 3111; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1, 1925, ch. 73, § 1;
R.S. 1933, 42-1-41; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943,
42-1-41; L. 1943, ch. 48, § 1; 1945, ch. 65, § 1;
1949, ch. 52, § 1: 1957, ch. 62, § 1, 1963, ch. 49,
§ 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 2; 1984, ch. 76, § 1; 1985,
ch. 75, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment deleted "except agricultural laborers and domestic servants"
after "Every person" at the beginning of
subsec. (l)(b); deleted "devoting full time to
the partnership or proprietorship business"
from the end of the first sentence in subsec.
(3) and substituted "$866.67 per month" for
"$400 per month" in the last sentence of
subsec. (3); and made minor changes m
phraseology.
The 1984 amendment redesignated subsections; substituted "chapter" for "title" in
subsec. (1); substituted "chapter" for "act" in
the first and third sentences of subsec. (3),
substituted "1501 of the state's average
weekly wage" in the last sentence of subsec.
(3) for "$866.67 per month", and made minor
changes in phraseology, punctuation and
style.

and employee he hired to paint and repair
units for forty hours a month was not within
the exclusion of subd. (2) of this section.
Sorenson v. Industrial Comm. (1979) 598 P 2d
362.
Loaned employee.
Where employee of trucking company was
assigned by the company to haul a load of
wood paneling for the defendant and directed
by the company to assist defendant's employees in loading the truck, for purposes of this
act the truck driver became defendant's
employee during the loading process, and
when he was injured in the course of it, his
remedy against defendant was limited to the
collection of workmen's compensation benefits. Bambrough v. Bethers (1976) 552 P 2d
1286.
Volunteer worker.
Helper in a school shop class pursuant to
the Retired Senior Volunteer Program was a
volunteer worker, and not an employee of the
school, and was therefore not entitled to
workers' compensation benefits, where there
was no express or implied contract of hire
between the helper and the school, the helper
received no compensation from the school,
and the school had no control over his hours
or any other aspect of his volunteer work
Board of Education of Alpine School Dist. v.
Olsen (1984) 684 P 2d 49.

Business of employer.
Owner of ten parcels of real property on
which were 19 rental units which owner
actively managed was in the rental business,

35-1-45. Compensation for i n d u s t r i a l accidents to be paid. Every employee
mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of every such
employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or
death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines,
and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter.
The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917,
§ 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1984 amendment substituted "as provided in this chapter" in the first sentence
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for "as is herein provided", added the second
sentence; and made minor changes in phraseology, punctuation and style.
Accident.
Death of employee who had a preexisting

35-1-57
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History: L. 1917, CIL 100, §67; C. L.
1917, §3128; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1 ; R. S.
1933, 42-1-53; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1 ; C. 1943,
42-1-53.

for those who seek employment. Industrial
Comm. v. Daly Mining Co., 51 TJ. 602, 172
P. 301.
This section is intended to require all
employers to post notice with appropriate
information whether the employer provided insurance or elected directly to pay
compensation; and intent and purpose of
section being clear, it cannot be defeated
by inadvertent omission of certain words
since court will give it effect in order to
effectuate what clearly appears to be its
true purpose. If employer fails to bring
himself within provisions of Workmen'3
Compensation Act by compliance with
this section, the employee may pursue
his common-law remedies against emplover.
Murray v. Strike, 76 U. 118, 287 P. 922.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1939 amendment inserted "as herein
provided" near the beginning of the sec
tion; and made a minor change in punctuation.
Form and sufficiency of notice.
Oral notice to employee does not comply
with requirements of this section. Murray
v. Strike, 76 U. 118, 287 P. 922.
Purpose and object of notice.
The purpose of requiring notices to be
posted is to inform all those who may seek
employment that payment of compensation
to which they may become entitled is
secured as provided in act (35-1-1 et seq.) ;
such notice is for benefit of employees or

Collateral References.
Workmen's Compensahon<§=*1045.
100 C.J.S. W o r k m e n ' s Compensation
§357.

35-1-57. Noncompliance—Penalty.—Employers who shall fail to comply
with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of
this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's officers,
agents or employees, and also to the dependents or personal representatives
of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following defenses:
the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of risk,
or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any
civil action permitted under this section against the employer the employee
shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed
against the employer.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §68; C. L.
1917, §3129; R. S. 1933, 42-1-54; L. 1939,
ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-54; L. 1969, ch. 86,
§2.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1939 amendment substituted "two
sections next succeeding" for "section next
succeeding" m the fourth sentence.
The 1969 amendment added the fifth
sentence.
Cross-Reference.
Fellow servants, 34-25-1 et seq.
Applicability of section.
The word "employer'' is used in this

section to encompass only an employer in
a situation where the employment status
is localized in Utah. United Airlines
Transport Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 110
U. 590, 175 P. 2d 752.
Election between causes of action.
Where plaintiff, in his amended complaint, set forth three alternative causes
of action, the first two in negligence and
the third under this section and 35-1-46,
it was reversible error for the lower court
at the pretrial hearing to require plaintiff
to make an election between the three
causes contrary to Rule 8 (e) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rosander v. Larsen,
14 U. (2d) 1, 376 P. 2d 146.
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